Globalization, alternative modernities and the political economy of Turkey

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ABSTRACT

This paper is an attempt to provide a political economic analysis of the changing nature of Turkish modernity since the 1980s, especially in the 1990s. Our analysis is founded upon the three years-long research (1999–2002) we have done on the question of 'the impacts of globalization on Turkey'. The Turkish economy has collapsed on 19 February 2001, and since then it has been going through a very strong and harsh restructuring programme aiming at creating a new mode of regulation of the state-society relations. The paper argues in this context that a political economic analysis of Turkish modernity is timely and necessary not only to understand the significant changes that have occurred in societal relations in terms of the emergence of new economic and civil society actors and their discourses/strategies, but also, and more importantly, to see that a long-term solution to the economic crisis requires taking seriously these actors and their societal visions. In doing so, the paper also attempts to contribute to the literature on global/alternative modernities by demonstrating how economy and culture are articulated in a specific national context.

KEYWORDS

Turkey; globalization; alternative modernities; culture; crisis; production.

Antonio Gramsci’s famous statement that ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’, although penned as early as the 1930s, captures and expresses eloquently the sense of ambivalence and insecurity that marks the present
nature of the world in which we live (in Keyman, 2000: 207). If one of the crucial fronts at which the ambivalent nature of world affairs manifests itself is the total reduction of the global fight against terrorism to the war in the post-September-11 world, the other equally important and devastating front has been the recent economic and financial crises that have created tragic and disturbing results in different parts of the world by causing unemployment, poverty, and social and political unrest.

In this paper, we will attempt to provide a political economic analysis of the changing nature of Turkish modernity since the 1980s, especially in the 1990s. As a country, taking place on the margins of Europe, trying to become a full-member, as well as the first member with a prominently Muslim population, of the European Union (hereafter EU), and constituting an economic and geo-political bridge between the west and the east, Turkey provides an interesting and illuminating case-study of the feeling of ambivalence with respect to the latter front, that is the devastating fact of economic crisis. This is because, similar to the Argentinean case, the Turkish economy has faced one of the most severe crises of its economic history in the second half of February 2001. The crisis has negatively and very strongly affected every segment of society by giving rise to the contraction of the national economy by 9.4 per cent, causing Turkey around 53 billion dollars loss in its gross national product, creating more than one million unemployed and reducing the gross national income from 2,986 dollars down to 2,160 dollars in 2001 (The dailies Milliyet and Radikal, 1 April 2002).

The recent economic crisis in February 2001 has been investigated in a detailed fashion and debated extensively by political economists. In these debates, it is commonly argued that the crisis of Turkish economy has a number of features similar to the recent financial crises that have occurred in world economy (such as the Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian crisis in 1997 and the Argentinean crisis in 2000) and that the exchange-rate-based stabilization programs, imposed by the International Monetary Fund (hereafter IMF) on these economies, have been integral to the emergence of such crises (Akyüz and Boratav, 2001; Yeldan, 2001; Alper and Öniş, 2003). Thus it is claimed that the roots of the crisis lie in both the structural weakness of the Turkish economy and its financial liberalization since the 1980s, in which Turkey’s premature exposure to financial globalization has created serious economic and political problems (Alper and Öniş, 2003; Yeldan, 2001). As domestic financial markets were liberalized before fiscal discipline has been secured, they were left defenseless against the speculative runs of the financial arbiters, the main result of which was the recent economic crisis ‘as a direct outcome of the neo-liberal policies of the post-1980’ functioning to expose economic life to ‘the unfettered, excessively myopic and erratic market forces’ (Yeldan, 2001: 4).

In addition to these economic factors, on the political side, ‘two elements of democracy deficit – lack of accountability and lack of transparency – were
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at the heart of the recent economic crisis' (Alper and Öniş, 2003: 16). These manifested themselves in the deteriorating performance of the banking sector and the financial system. Public banks distributed credits on non-economic criteria with the consequence that they caused significant loses in real terms. Moreover, these loses were concealed for a long-time due to the non-transparent accounting procedures of the public banks (Alper and Öniş, 2001: 16). Thus, the economic crisis has unearthed the legitimacy and governing crisis of the state whose clientalist and corruption-producing mode of regulation of societal affairs has marked the nature of Turkish politics in the 1990s.

It can be argued, in this context that an effective solution to the crisis should be sought not only in economy, but in the clientalistic, unaccountable and corrupt nature of Turkish politics. Such an effective solution should be based upon an attempt to 'restructure the state-society relations' in a democratic way that the state becomes an effective governing institution capable of responding to the needs and demands of society. The economic restructuring program for overcoming the February crisis financed by the IMF and supported by the World Bank, was an important attempt to restructure the state on the basis of macroeconomic stability and a new governing rationality for creating a sound political development management (Derviş, 2001: 5). For Kemal Derviş, who was appointed as the state minister responsible for economic affairs and acted as the architect of the new economic program, the restructuring of the state in a way to make it more efficient and accountable was imperative to achieve the elimination of structural distortions caused by clientalism and populism, as well as the establishment of sound macroeconomic management necessary for economic growth through the eradication of inflation and the strengthening of the financial sector.

However, this economic program, designed according to the structural adjustment policy of the IMF, was based on the (neo-liberal) logic of macroeconomic rationality that privileges the financial sector over production, insofar as it acts with the unquestioned belief that without a strong and stable financial sector, economic growth would not be possible, and that shifting the focus of the economic program on production should be deferred until the sound political development and the stable macroeconomic rationality are to be achieved in Turkey. Although we accept the importance of this economic rationality for overcoming the February crisis in Turkey, we will argue in this paper that if we are to strive for creating a different, democratic and economically advanced Turkey, we have to focus on 'production', that is, on what is called the 'reel sector' of the economic sphere and take seriously the societal visions and the strategies of the economic actors whose activities are based on production, and who have given dynamism and change to the economic and the cultural life in Turkish society. In other words, a long-term, effective and democratic
solution not only to the February crisis, but more importantly to the structural problems of the state-centric Turkish modernity lies in an attempt to restructure state-society relations by taking into consideration the changing sociological and institutional nature of the political economy of Turkish capitalism.

In order to substantiate our argument, we will provide a political economy-based analysis of Turkish capitalism, in which our focus is not general, but rather restricted. In our analysis, we focus on the important and powerful economic actors, namely those of ‘The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’ (hereafter TÜSİAD), ‘The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’ (hereafter MÜSİAD) and ‘The Associations of Industrialists and Businessmen’ (hereafter SİADs) in terms of their different societal visions, different identity/citizenship claims and different institutional strategies. These actors and their strategies mark the changing nature of Turkish economy since the 1990s, play an important role in the construction of strong societal demands for the creation of a democratic and economically stable Turkey, and act as powerful economic pressure groups forcing the state to transform itself into an effective, accountable and transparent governing institution. Our institutional and actor-focused analysis of Turkish capitalism is also based on our three-year long research project in which we have investigated the discourses and strategies that these powerful economic actors have developed during the 1990s within the context of ‘the impacts of globalization on Turkey’ with respect to economy, culture and society. Thus, we will argue that a political economy-based analysis of Turkish capitalism by focusing on these actors enables one to recognize that in the way in which these economic actors develop their own societal visions and their own discourse and strategies about Turkey is not purely economic, but embedded in an historical articulation of economy with culture. For, as we will see, these actors act not only as economic interest groups, but also as pressure groups/civil society organizations, giving voice to different identity/recognition claims and citizenship rights, and thereby giving rise to different societal visions or what we call ‘alternative models of Turkish modernity’. Therefore, our analysis takes culture seriously and approaches it as a constitutive element of political economy.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF TURKISH MODERNITY

The last two decades have brought about a fundamental change in Turkish modernity, and have also created a ‘paradox’ in Turkish society, a paradox that has not yet been solved. This paradox finds its meaning in the simultaneous development of the ‘increasing dominance of economic liberalization’ in economic life, whose laws of motion are, to a large extent,
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dictated by economic globalization, that is the economic logic of western modernity, and the emergence of the politics of identity/recognition that has taken different forms, such as the resurgence of Islam, the Kurdish question and the liberal claims to rights and freedoms, all of which have become powerful actors in Turkish social and political life. In other words, the formation of Turkish modernity since the 1980s has been increasingly marked by the co-existence of economic liberalization and the resurgence of traditionalism and its appeal to the 'return to authenticity'.

The historical context, in which this paradoxical development has occurred and influenced Turkish social and political life, is not only national, but also global in nature, which has given rise to three distinct, but nevertheless interrelated processes, dictating the direction of Turkish capitalism/modernity since the 1980s, especially in the 1990s. The first process is 'the legitimacy crisis of the strong-state tradition' in Turkey since the 1980s. Turkish modernization, since the beginning of the Republic, has been characterized by and has given rise to the 'strong-state tradition'. This tradition means, first, that the state has assumed the capacity of acting almost completely independent from civil society, and second, that the state, rather than the government, has constituted 'the primary context of politics' (Heper, 1985; Kramer, 2000). The strong-state tradition has functioned as the organizing 'internal variable' of Turkish politics up until the 1980s. However, since the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the emergence of new actors, new mentalities and the new language of modernization, as well as democracy as a global point of reference in politics, has made culture and cultural factors an important variable in understanding political activities. It has become apparent that in the 1990s the strong state faced a serious difficulty to respond to the new societal problems and demands, especially those articulated of identity-terms and asking for the protection of social and political rights, as well as the recognition of the ethnic and religious differences. The strong state turned out to be too strong in its attempt to impose itself on society, and too weak in governing its society effectively (Kramer, 2000). Thus, the strong state has faced (and still faces) a serious legitimacy problem in maintaining its position as the primary context for politics, as a result of the shift towards civil society and culture as new reference-points in the language and the terms of politics.

The second process related to the legitimacy crisis of the strong-state tradition is 'the changing meaning of modernity in Turkey', that is, the process of 'the emergence of alternative modernities'. Since the 1980s, the process of Turkish modernization involved new actors, new mentalities of development and new identity claims. These mentalities and claims can be considered 'alternative models of Turkish modernity'. It should be pointed out here that these models are not only cultural or discursive, but they are institutionally and materially constructed. They represent a specific articulations of culture and capital, they do so in a specific institutional setting,
and they produce alternatives to the state-centric model of modernity. However, two points of demarcation are worth making here: firstly, the concept of alternative modernities refers to a strong critique of the status of the secular-rational thinking as the exclusive source of modernity in Turkey, and secondly, the term ‘alternative’ does not suggest a critique of, or opposition to, capital; instead, the alternative models of Turkish modernity operate as specific articulations of culture and capital.

In other words, the ‘alternative’ in alternative modernities does not necessarily suggest a critique of, or opposition to, capital. Rather, it suggests the kinds of modernity that are (1) constituted by different sets of relations between the developmental or post-developmental state, its population and global capital; and (2) constructed by political and social elites who appropriate ‘western’ knowledge and re-represent them as truth-claims about their own countries. (Ong, 1999: 35)

As we will see, the economic actors under investigation in this paper represent the liberal, the Islamic and the conservative articulations of culture and capital, from within which their own models of Turkish modernity are institutionally and materially constructed.

In order to understand these two processes, that is, the legitimacy crisis of the strong-state tradition and the emergence of alternative modernities, we also have to refer to the third process, that is, ‘the process of globalization’ which involves mostly ‘Turkey’s full-membership application to the EU’, ‘the end of the Cold War’ as those constraining factors that have had important short-term and long-term impacts on the interaction of politics, polity and policy in the 1990s in Turkish politics. It is suggested, in this context, that the end of the Cold War has generated important consequences for Turkey in terms of its foreign and domestic policy initiatives. While, since 1989, the geo-political and historical significance of Turkey in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia has become increasingly apparent, the collapse of the Soviet Union has drastically changed Turkey’s role as a buffer-state in the east-west relations during the Cold War. More importantly, the end of the Cold War has created important changes in political culture, as it has brought about a possibility that Turkish people in a nationalistic fashion,

may now come to see themselves once again at the center of a world emerging around them rather than at the tail-end of a European world that is increasingly uncertain about whether or not it sees Turkey as part of itself. (Fuller and Lesser, 1993)

This uncertainty has become more apparent as Turkey has attempted to integrate into the EU as its full member, which has created a new political cleavage in Turkey between pro- and anti-European integration forces.
In this sense, the question of European integration has given rise to both nationalism and liberalism as dominant political ideologies in Turkish politics, and it has served as an important point of reference by which different actors position themselves in terms of social change and democracy. For instance, as we will elaborate later, despite the differences with respect to their specific claims to identity and modernity, the economic actors all locate themselves as strong supporters of the process of European integration.

Likewise, they also share the common suggestion that since 1980, Turkish society has been subject to ‘significant change’, in which the processes of globalization operate and generate impacts on societal affairs. For them, in general, globalization refers to the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies so that events in one part of the world more and more have economic, cultural and political effects on peoples and societies far away. This understanding of globalization implies, first that ‘change’ in a globalizing world requires us to come to terms with the fact that it is no longer possible to understand change only with reference to the national unit, since global/local forces have become as important as national actors (Öniş, 2001; Strange, 1996). It implies, secondly, that culture can no longer be taken as secondary to politics and economics. It is culture that makes it possible for new actors to emerge, for us to think about politics and political actors outside of the strong-state tradition, and for hitherto silenced identities to create a change in the meaning of modernity (Keyman, 1997). However, the way in which culture becomes a main point of reference for the analysis of change does not constitute a single process, but manifests itself differently in different spheres of social life. Cultural globalization creates both the universalization of western values and cultural patterns, and at the same time the revitalization of local values and traditions, paving the way to the universalization of western modernity and the emergence of alternative modernities.5

GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TURKISH CAPITALISM

The most visible impacts of cultural globalization on Turkish society can be observed in ‘economic life’ whose scope, discourse and actors have been enlarging since the 1980s, and whose organizational structure has been increasingly extended beyond the national and territorial borders. In fact, since the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, the Turkish economy has been; (a) exposed to the process of the globalization of capital and trade, and (b) organized on the basis of the primacy of the global market over the domestic one, which has led economic actors to realize (c) that market relations require rational and long-term strategies, and (d) that in order to be secure and successful in (globalized) economic life, it is imperative to gain organizational capabilities to produce or maintain technological
improvement and strategic planning for production and investment. As a result, in the last decade, we have seen the increasing importance of the discourse of ‘free market’, the multiplication and the dissemination of economic actors, and the pluralization of economic organizations in Turkish society.

While up until the mid-1980s, economic life in Turkey was organized mainly around national industry without a cultural codification, the 1990s have witnessed the rise of what is called ‘Islamic capital’ as a powerful economic actor. The rise of Islamic capital has given rise to the introduction of Islam to the political economy of Turkish capitalist development, both discursively and organizationally. During the 1990s, Islam began to operate as an economic code open to free market ideology, and also created its own economic organization founded upon the (Weberian) principles of rational, technical knowledge and expertise. The establishment of MÜSİAD was a clear sign of the articulation and the ‘co-existence’ of Islam with free market ideology. It should be noted here that the qualification of MÜSİAD as ‘Islamic’ is due to the fact that (a) it is affiliated with religious sects and communities; (b) Islam appears as a significant point of reference in its activities; and (c) it has close ties with political Islam mainly represented in Turkey since the 1980s by the Welfare Party, then the Virtue Party and finally the Justice and Development Party. The success of MÜSİAD to ‘bring together a large number of enterprises of different sizes located in different geographical regions of Turkey’, and ‘to create a network within economic life on the basis of relations of trust among believers’ can be considered an indicator of the possibility of the co-existence of Islam with the western-rational model of organizational behavior (Buğra, 1999: 11–2). Thus, it can be argued that during the last decade, in addition to ‘political Islam’, ‘economic Islam’ too has put its print on Turkish modernity. Today, it is not possible to analyze the globalization of Turkish economic life without reference to MÜSİAD and the dissemination of its sub-units throughout the country.

However, since the early 1990s, a third-type of economic organization in Turkey has occurred as a significant point of reference in understanding the formation of economic life in Turkey and the impact of cultural globalization on it. This type of economic organization is called at the very general level, SIAD, but gains a concrete institutional quality, as it is associated with a city or a region in Turkey. In other words, SIADs exist in most of the Anatolian cities and they are organized independently from TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD. They have been included in our research not only because they are important economic actors and contribute to advancing our understanding of the changing nature of Turkish economic, political and cultural life, but also because some cities in Anatolia, such as Gaziantep, Konya, Denizli, Çorum, Kayseri and Eskişehir, have provided us with interesting, if not significant, economic success stories, and have
acted as the examples of a peculiar model of what can be called ‘morally and culturally loaded-economic modernization’.9

TÜSİAD AND THE LIBERAL MODEL OF MODERNITY

TÜSİAD was established on 2 April 1971 with a Memorandum announcing the foundation of first voluntary association by the twelve leading industrialists of the country. As stated in the Memorandum, the Association would contribute to Turkey’s achieving the standards of living and industrialization already attained by the developed western world (the TÜSİAD Founders Memorandum, 2 April 1971). Since its establishment, TÜSİAD has undergone radical changes and transformations. With its selective membership, TÜSİAD has 469 members representing almost 1,500 companies. Its membership is composed of owners and managers of individual firms, groups of companies operating almost in all major sectors of the Turkish economy (TÜSİAD Brochure, 2002). According to TÜSİAD’s 1997 membership profile, total sales volume of the member companies surveyed was $65.7 billion, or 40.9 per cent of Turkey’s value added in the relevant sector. TÜSİAD members have generated 35.5 per cent of Turkish exports and 20.8 per cent of imports in goods and services (TÜSİAD Brochure, 2001). TÜSİAD has no branches, but has three representations in Ankara, Brussels, and Washington DC. As ‘the biggest and most powerful business organization and pressure group in Turkey’, TÜSİAD had perceived the 1961 Constitution as too democratic for Turkey and also supported the 1980 military-coup (Özkan and Tozan, 2000: 32). But now, TÜSİAD acts as the strong voice in the call for the democratization of Turkey in accordance with the standards of democracy in Europe and argues for the need to protect civil rights and liberalization. It presents itself as an organization that ‘has changed over time’. As the former president of TÜSİAD, Erkut Yücaoğlu says that this change, which the organization has gone through in the last two decades, has to a large extent been framed by globalization; that is, by the changing nature of world economic and political affairs that have made democracy not only necessary but the sufficient condition for modernization and development (NPQ, 1999: 55).

To substantiate this general point, the following claims are made by the members of TÜSİAD:

(i) TÜSİAD perceives globalization to be a process that operates beyond the borders of national societies. As a process, globalization is mainly concerned with the globalization of the market, and is about the emergence of the interconnectedness between countries, especially with respect to the movements of capital, finance and trade. It is an ‘historical reality’, constituting the new context for economic and political modernization in
Turkey (Özbudun and Keyman, 2002). According to TÜSİAD, as opposed to the import-substitution industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s in Turkey, in which the nation-state was the major actor of national development, the globalization of market relations, taking place beyond the reach of the nation-states, has been the main point of reference for the economic life and its actors since the 1980s. In this sense, globalization brings about a set of new and novel relations, involving also the increasing importance of supra-national relations that create new regulations beyond the borders of the nation-state. For Turkey, the process of integration to the EU constitutes the most important supra-national relations, insofar as, according to TÜSİAD, it will determine the future of Turkey by contributing to advancing the level of both political modernization and economic development of Turkish society. For this reason, TÜSİAD acts as the strongest and the most effective supporter of Turkey’s full EU membership by lobbying in the EU member countries through its office in Brussels, giving full-page advertisement to newspapers.10

(ii) According to the members of TÜSİAD, globalization also brings about a new culture in economic life, that is, it forces the economic actors to acquire a ‘new economic rationality’ in accordance to which they are supposed to act, prepare economic strategies, and take decisions. Globalization frames cognitively the strategies and the decisions of economic actors. Thus, the possibility of economic success lies in the mentalities of economic actors themselves, their ability to articulate cognitively the new economic rationality, and their capacity to make long-term strategies to secure their position in global markets, which can only be possible by focusing on technological innovation and quality maintenance. Two points can be extrapolated from the new economic rationality. According to a TÜSİAD member, a new economic rationality also creates changes in the mentalities of economic actors whose identity-formation now involves new values, such as technological orientation, the advocating of knowledge and information over tradition, the adaptation of a global network society and the preference of the long-term strategies over short-term gains.11 Secondly, the adaptation to the new economic rationality also brings about a new discursive platform for the creation of a cultural identity based on ‘a set of symbols’ by which economic actors differentiate themselves from one another, as well as from the early generation industrialists and businessmen. In this sense, one of the impacts of globalization in economic life has been the creation of ‘symbolic capital’ internal to the identity-formation of economic actors.
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This identity involves post-modern references to such symbols as
life-styles, taste, outlook, body, and consumption patterns (Bali,
2002: 54). In this context, it is suggested that economic global-
ization generates changes not only in economic organization,
but also in the identity-formation of economic actors.
(iii) TÜSİAD holds the idea that at the level of society at large, the
processes of globalization have given rise to two interrelated
facts, namely the rise of cultural identity which has taken the
forms of the resurgence of Islam and the ‘Kurdish problem’ and
the need for the protection of civil rights (Keyman and İçduygu,
2003a,b). Both of these facts require a democratic organization
of the state-society relations in Turkey. TÜSİAD thinks that
Turkey’s exposure to the globalizing world has two dimensions:
the first is the problem of integration into the EU, and secondly,
the status and the location of Turkey in world politics. Turkey
has the potential to become what they call ‘a country that belongs
to the first league nations’, but they believe that in order to
achieve both, Turkey has to solve the problems stemming from
the lack of democratization and political liberalism, problems
such as the violation of human rights, the protection of civil
rights and the acceptance of the rule of law as the fundamental
basis of state power.12 Globalization, in this sense, appears both
as the process related to the emergence of the problems con-
fronting the Turkish state and as the primary-point of reference
for the solution of this problem through democratization.
(iv) Therefore, for TÜSİAD, the possibility of the realization of its
economic interests embedded in the global market is directly
linked to the democratization of Turkey at large. Especially,
during the 1990s, TÜSİAD has also acted as a civil society
organization by assuming a ‘democratic-identity’ having a
societal vision to make Turkey a liberal, plural democratic
society. This means that as opposed to the 1970s and the
1980s, TÜSİAD ‘has changed’ in the 1990s by acting not only
as an economic actor but also as a civil society organization
assuming responsibility for what is good for Turkey at large and
striving for democratization which is the necessary condition
for ‘the elevation of Turkey to the first league nations in world
affairs’.13
(v) In its societal vision for democratic Turkey, TÜSİAD regards
cultural globalization as creating both the universalization of
democracy and the revitalization of traditional values and
norms (Özbudun and Keyman, 2002). However, while TÜSİAD
values the rise of cultural Islam and the Kurdish question to the
extent that they function within the pluralistic and multi-cultural

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social formation, it positions itself against the politicization of the identity and recognition-claims of these movements. TÜSİAD sees such politicization as an attempt that denounces rather than promotes democracy. In this context, for TÜSİAD, the co-existence between western values and the religious and ethnic identity politics is possible as far as cultural life in Turkey is concerned, but this does not alter the clash between secularism and political Islam insofar as the latter remains both in discourse and in practice as a ‘threat to liberal democracy’. For this reason, in order to make Islam and ethnicity compatible to democracy, TÜSİAD advocates a liberal model of citizenship as ‘self-rule’ (Ong, 1999: 1–29) in which a modern self accepts the primacy of individual rights over cultural identity claims, acts according to the rule of law and expresses her/his cultural identity in private sphere. Thus, TÜSİAD claims that the establishment and the dissemination of the liberal model of citizenship in and throughout Turkey solve the clashes and the tensions that have existed (and still exist) between the strong state and the claims to difference and recognition (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003a,b). This model of citizenship as self-rule frames the recent democratic discourse of TÜSİAD and gives meaning to its activities aiming at reconstructing and transforming the state-centric Turkish modernity into that which takes a liberal-democratic form.

Two important conclusions are worth making here. Firstly, the changing nature of TÜSİAD during the 1990s cannot be understood without reference to cultural globalization which functions as an ‘integral element’ of the discourse, the strategy and the activities of the organization as both an economic actor and as a democratic civil-society organization. Globalization contributes to the enlargement of the scope and the content of TÜSİAD activities from an economic self-interested pressure group, to a collective-identity striving for the realization of its vision of democratic Turkey. Secondly, as both an economic actor (a pressure group) and a civil society organization, TÜSİAD makes a strong call for the need to democratize the state-society relations in Turkey on the basis of a ‘liberal model of modernity’ which regulates cultural identity claims through the language of individual rights, promotes an individualistic notion of citizenship as self-rule, and operates as a democratic constitutional state that approaches society in a minimalist mode and through the rule of law. For TÜSİAD, in a globalizing world, the liberal model of modernity constitutes a suitable, feasible and effective way for creating a democratic Turkey ready not only to be a full member of the EU, but also to become a powerful actor in international relations.
MÜSİAD AND THE ISLAMIC MODEL OF MODERNITY

MÜSİAD was established on 5 May 1990 by a handful of young businessmen, with an average age of under 33, dedicated to creating a developed country with advanced high-tech industry within a highly developed commercial environment, but without sacrificing national and moral values, where labor is not exploited and capital accumulation is not degraded and where distribution of income is just and fair, a country with peace at home, influence in the region. Members of the organization committed to social and economic development in the country by promoting production in industry, honesty and fairness in trade, high ethical and moral politics. They are dedicated to finding solutions to the problems of Turkey, Islamic countries in the region and mankind in general. (MÜSİAD website)

MÜSİAD, with its members in small and medium-sized industries mostly located in Central and Eastern Anatolian cities, is the largest voluntary business organization in Turkey. Within twelve years, it has established thirty branches and has reached nearly 3,000 members. MÜSİAD has also representative or liaison offices in about twenty foreign countries (The Special Supplement of Daily News, 21 May 1997). With about 10,000 firms, belonging to its members, MÜSİAD has nearly 35 billion-dollar share in the Gross National Product (MÜSİAD Pocket Book, 12, April 2002). The 80 per cent of these firms consists of middle-scale ones whose economic activities are mainly export-oriented. There is no doubt that MÜSİAD is the most important business organization that claims to carry with itself an ‘Islamic identity’, and playing a crucial role in (a) linking together business organizations having closer ties with the rise of Islam, (b) supporting, promoting and protecting their economic interests, and (c) developing a societal vision on the basis of Islamic principles. By creating a ‘powerful network based upon trust-relations’ among Islamic economic actors, MÜSİAD has become as significant and powerful as TÜSİAD, even to the degree of confronting its dominance in Turkish economic life. With MÜSİAD, we have seen that the link between Islam and western rationality is possible, and that the embeddedness of Islamic discourse in economic and cultural globalization creates the co-existence between Islamic identity and free market ideology.

This general account of MÜSİAD can be substantiated on the basis of the following points we have extrapolated from our research of MÜSİAD:

(i) Like TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD too views globalization as a process whereby exchange activities go beyond the borders of the nation-state and operate within a global market. Globalization creates interconnectedness among societies, economies and cultures, and
sets ‘the rules of the game’ which requires a rational thinking, long-term strategies and organizational capacities (Özbudun and Keyman, 2002). This interconnectedness operates both internationally and regionally. Like TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD advocates Turkey’s EU membership, as it will provide new trade partners for them. In this sense, globalization becomes the new historical context for economic development. MÜSİAD also attributes a positive quality to globalization because it is as a result of the globalization of market relations that a suitable ground was created for the ‘rise and the success of economic Islam’ (Öniş, 1997).

(ii) However, unlike TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD is founded on Islamic principles, such as the feeling of trust and solidarity, the primacy of community over the individual, the discourse of the just-self over the self-interested actor, and the privileged status of ethical codes over individual morality. Thus, MÜSİAD argues that Islamic discourse is far more compatible with globalized market relations than the existing state-supported bourgeois class in Turkey, insofar as it creates the relation of trust and solidarity in economy. MÜSİAD here refers to the ‘East Asian model of development’, in which, it is believed, the success comes from ‘the “strategic fit” between the traditional institutions that regulate social relations and the requirements of global markets’ (Buğra, 1998: 528). The former and the first president of MÜSİAD, Erol Yarar, explains the importance of the East Asian model with respect to the economic development of Turkey in the following way: ‘at the threshold of the twenty-first century, once again the western side of the Pacific, that is the east of China is becoming the dominant center of the world economy’ (Yarar, 1996: 3). As opposed to the western industrial model, this new model is based on the link between ‘small or medium-sized enterprises’ and ‘the culture of traditional values’ embedded in family or religion. By following the East Asian model, MÜSİAD presents itself as an alternative to the nonviable capitalist development and centers its activities on ‘Homo Islamicus’ which is the proper ethical basis for economic development, rather than ‘Homo Economicus’ that has given rise to a self-centered individualistic morality.

(iii) In this context, MÜSİAD argues that its discourse, strategies and actors create what is called, the ‘proper Islamic discourse’, which is neither backward, nor mystical, nor solely traditional, but, on the contrary, is progressive, open to economic and technological innovation, compatible with free trade and capitalism, and able to create the sources of wealth. This means that like TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD promotes technology and quality maintenance. Its actors prefer and prepare long-term and rational
strategies over short-term interests to secure their success, and their entrepreneurial activities are embedded in capitalism and the economic rules of capitalist rationality. Economic Islam, then, promotes capitalism as economic globalization but situates it in Islamic discourse as its cultural basis. Thus, as the representative of economic Islam, MÜSİAD articulates Islam with economic globalization, but at the same time creates a societal vision, based on the primacy of cultural/communitarian identity over individualistic morality.

(iv) This communitarian societal vision has been directly derived from MÜSİAD’s positive view of globalization, which provides a basis both for the challenge MÜSİAD initiates against the existing politico-economic order (that is, statism and secularism), and for its promotion of ‘Homo Islamicus’. Thus, MÜSİAD sees globalization as a factor contributing to the development of pluralism and multiculturalism, thereby creating a platform for democratization in Turkey. Here, globalization is seen in relation to the integration process in Europe, where Turkey wants to be a full-member of the EU. Here, globalization functions as both a conditioning and an enabling factor: (a) conditioning in the sense that it requires, even forces the Turkish state to be open to democracy, which creates a legitimate ground for Islamic discourse as an element of pluralism and multiculturalism; and (b) enabling in the sense that it enables economic Islam to operate beyond the borders of the nation-state.

(v) However, two points should be made here: first, MÜSİAD’s view of pluralism and multiculturalism is not liberal, insofar as it accords primacy to community over the individual (Özbudun and Keyman, 2002). In fact, for them, it is not individuality but community, in which self-identity is discursively constructed and defined. Community, based on Islamic discourse, comes before individual preferences and morality, so that the references to democracy, freedom and morality, and in this sense pluralism and multiculturalism, are situated in and framed by the communitarian ideology rather than liberalism. Secondly, this communitarian ideology, which also explains the link between economic Islam and its aspiration of the East Asian model of economic development, gives a clear expression to MÜSİAD’s view of the community-based economic organization. MÜSİAD constitutes a community-based economic organization, founded upon an articulation of Islamic cultural/moral identity and free trade, which overrides class/power/wealth differences between capital and labor. This means that Islam defines the identity of both the owner and the producer, makes them part of the economic
community, and masks the inequality, the unevenness and the
difference between them in terms of power and wealth. For ex-
ample, the discourse of justice and fairness that economic Islam
uses never involves references to the organizational rights of pro-
ducers for unionization, strike, security, health and welfare. In
fact, the communitarian ideology that economic Islam promotes
acts against the principles of the welfare state and distributive
justice in general, and the organizational rights of the produc-
ers in particular. MÜSİAD is in fact a class-based organization,
which uses Islamic discourse to ‘justify’ its communitarian ide-
ology and to ‘mobilize’ its economic activities.

As an effective economic actor and a powerful pressure group that links Is-
lam with western economic rationality, MÜSİAD constitutes a strong alter-
native to Turkish secular modernity, historically framed by the strong-state
tradition. In doing so, it produces the co-existence between Islamic iden-
tity and free market ideology, supports the exposure of Turkish economy
and society to the globalized world, and acts as a pressure group that
sees the possibility of creating a democratic and economically advanced
Turkey in the process of European integration. In this sense, MÜSİAD and
its Islamic self-identity is not anti-modern nor a critique of and an oppo-
sition to capital: instead, it constitutes an ‘alternative claim to modernity’,
or what can be called an ‘Islamic model of modernity’ as a morally and
culturally loaded-economic modernization. Thus, unlike TÜSİAD’s liberal
model, which gives primacy to individualism and the language of rights,
MÜSİAD’s Islamic claim to modernity advocates community and the lan-
guage of the societal good. This claim provides a communitarian societal
vision in which Islam functions as the main articulating principle between
capital and labor by making both not the competing self-interested actors
but the service-producing and solidaristic members of an economic orga-
nization. Hence, MÜSİAD’s Islamic model of modernity, while arguing for
the need to restructure the state-society relations in Turkey on the basis of
the principles of democracy, pluralism and freedom, attempts to establish
and disseminate a communitarian modern self who is economically driven
and rationally acting, but at the same time morally loaded and ethically
just, thereby successfully articulating the global with the traditional.

SİADs AND THE CONSERVATIVE MODEL OF
MODERNITY

In recent years, we have witnessed the increasing importance, both qual-
itatively and quantitatively, in the province (city)-based and the regional-
based industrialist and business organizations (SİADs). There are 75 SİADs
with about 3,000 members in Turkey. Though it is hard to measure the to-
tal amount of export of SİADs, the export volume of Aegean SİAD can
be given as an example to highlight the importance of SİADs for Turkey’s total export. The total export volume of Aegean SİAD was 4.5 billion dollar in 2002. Thus, in addition to TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD, Turkish economic life now involves SİADs as economic actors with their own discourse and strategies. Even though they are not as strong and influential as TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD, they deserve our attention, insofar as (a) they have created a dynamic economic life in Anatolia, especially with the emergence of the economically successful Anatolian cities, known as ‘Anatolian tigers’; (b) with their economic success stories, they have played an important role in changing our ‘orientalist vision’ of Anatolia as an agriculture-based, underdeveloped and traditional social totality; and therefore (c) they have shown us that there are different ways in which the global is articulated with the local and creates different ‘social forms’ and ‘societal visions’.

In many ways, SİADs appear similar to TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD, in terms of their positive attribute to economic globalization, their support for Turkey’s full EU membership, their adherence of free trade ideology and their critique of the existing politico-economic order that privileges the strong state tradition over economic and cultural activities. Also, in terms of the scale and the scope of their economic organization, they represent, as in the case of MÜSİAD, small and medium-sized enterprises taking place in different regions of Anatolia. Thirdly, they promote a model of economic development, in which the link between free trade and traditional/communitarian cultural identity defines the very basis of economic life. In fact the condition of existence of SİADs and their modus vivendi is founded upon the promotion of community ties over individuality, as the pre-condition for economic success.

However, SİADs differ from TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD and gain specific characteristics in three fundamental ways:

(i) In their province or region-based organization, SİADs operate without state support and represent local development that depends exclusively on trade relations beyond the borders of the nation-state. In fact, they are the clearest cases in which the globalization of the local can be observed. For this reason, SİADs view economic and cultural globalization both as ‘internal’ to their emergence and development, and as processes making a positive and valuable contribution to the protection of their local cultures (Özbudun and Keyman, 2002).

(ii) All SİADs give primacy to community over individuality. They all define community as an ‘organic social and cultural unity’. In this sense, they all prefer homogeneity, commonality and sameness to pluralism and difference. Thus, they all promote conservative and communitarian societal visions over liberal individualism. And they all maintain that success in economic
life derives from the protection and the organization of cultural life as an ‘organic unity’. However, their view of what constitutes organic unity differs from MÜSİAD in that, for SİADs, Islamic discourse is not the exclusive source of cultural identity. Such references as nationalism, family ties, traditional norms, ethnicity and primordialism, also play a significant role in creating communitarian ties that make social and cultural life an organic unity. In this sense, SİADs resemble with, and also learn from the South-Asian experience which links the communitarian values with market economy. Successful SİADs, known as the Anatolian Tigers, for example Gaziantep, Konya, Kayseri, Çorum, Denizli, Aydın, Adana and Antalya, explain their economic development by emphasizing the importance of establishing organic organizational and cultural ties among powerful actors in their own communities. In fact, our research found that one of the ideas commonly shared by SİADs is related to the significant emphasis placed on the role of culture for economic development: that is, the extent to which organic unity is produced and reproduced in a given community determines the degree of success in economic life. Therefore, while those success stories were pointing out the value of organic unity for a successful linkage between the local and the global, in the provinces where underdevelopment remains, the economic actors complained about the lack of community spirit to create organic unity.

(iii) This emphasis on organic unity explains the overarching power of nationalism and conservatism at the political level in most of the provinces and regions of Anatolia, where moral and ethical community as an organic unity is seen as an unquestioned basis of the development of economic and cultural life. For this reason, SİADs, while promoting the linkage between the local and the global, also function as the ‘bearers of conservatism and nationalism’ in their societal visions. In doing so, unlike TÜSİAD or MÜSİAD, they promote a communitarian-moral self acting without being necessarily Islamic, but rather as an ethical citizen who gives primacy either to economic development and prosperity or to the recognition of difference (as in the case of the South Eastern SİADs whose activities are over-determined by the Kurdish question) over individual rights and freedoms. In this sense, the notion of citizenship with which SİADs operate is neither liberal nor Islamic, but communitarian and post-developmental in that it demands from the state to be ‘caring’ and open to the specific economic needs of the localities (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003a,b).

(iv) It should be pointed out, however, that their societal visions are limited and locally framed, in content, scope and scale to
the provinces wherein they operate. They are concerned about, and with, the success of their own provinces, and thus, unlike TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD whose societal vision talks about Turkish society at large, SİADs remain small-scale organizations both discursively and functionally, with their limited societal visions and their attempt to create an organic unity in their own communities. In this context, they constitute what can be described as ‘locally hegemonic historical projects’ (Ong, 1999: 36) aiming at making their own local site economically developed and prosperous by attempting to create new linkages with global capital, by demanding the nation-state to be caring and effectively responding to their own needs, and by maintaining the cultural unity of their own organic community. Thus, SİADs can be considered as local-based post-developmentalist identity attempting to create new linkages with the global inside a local reconstruction of the articulation between the modern and the traditional.

However limited their societal visions are, SİADs do nevertheless present an alternative model of modernity, not liberal nor Islamic but conservative and communitarian in nature, promoting an organic vision of community either in nationalist or traditionalist forms. This conservative model of modernity gives rise to a morally and culturally loaded-economic modernization, in which actors operate not as a liberal self but both as the members of an organic community striving for recognition and as communitarian citizens assuming the capacity to demand from the (post) development state to be ‘caring’ (Ong, 1999) in the way in which it approaches the needs of its local sites. This model of modernity is conservative in the sense that it privileges development over individual rights and freedoms, organic community over diversity and pluralism, and traditional values and mores over liberal and individualist life-styles. SİADs, in this context, present their own localities as modern without being anti-traditional, developmental without being individualist, and communitarian without being necessarily Islamic. Therefore, the conservative model of modernity arises from the active efforts of SİADs to constantly negotiate new relations with (global) capital without giving up their traditions and cultural differences. In fact, conservative modernity is constructed as a result of the articulation of the global with the local, of global capital with community as organic unity, and of economic rationality with a communitarian citizen whose self-identity is embedded in either in nationalistic or traditional ties. It is precisely in this articulation that the importance and the effectiveness of SİADs local model of conservative modernity lies, and in this sense SİADs should be taken seriously as important economic actors and cultural pressure groups whose contributions to local development
constitute a necessary and crucial dimension of any attempt to create a
democratic and economically advanced Turkey.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY

Having outlined the main discourse and strategies that TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD
and SIADs employ in relation to the linkage between globalization and
economic life in Turkey, we can conclude that such linkage takes the form of
‘the relation of co-existence’ between the global and the local. However, the
meaning that these economic actors attribute to the impacts of globalization
on Turkey vary in accordance with the different societal visions and the
competing identity/citizenship claims they promote. While all of them see
globalization as an internal element of the changing nature of economic
and cultural life in Turkey, act as strong supporters of Turkey’s integration
in the EU as a full member, and stress the importance of production for the
possibility of economic growth in Turkey, they differ in terms of their own
discourse on democracy, pluralism and freedom. This difference manifests
itself in the simultaneous promotion of both the universal language of civil
rights and individuality, and a communitarian cultural/moral identity as
a member of an organic unity. This means that free trade ideology as an
expression of economic globalization ‘coexists’ with both liberalism and
communitarianism in Turkish economic life.

The fact of co-existence rather than clash between the global and the
local has to be taken very seriously, and coming to terms with this fact, we
believe, is of utmost importance not only for understanding the changing
nature of the political economy of Turkish modernity, but more impor-
tantly, for establishing democracy in Turkey. For, these actors, taking place
in the production side of the Turkish economy and acting both as eco-
nomic interest groups and as pressure groups/civil society organization,
represent change and dynamism in societal affairs, bring about new and
alternative claims to modernity, and more importantly ask for an effective
and democratic governing that the strong state tradition is no longer able
to initiate. In this sense, taking seriously these actors’ alternative claims to
modernity help us to understand, first, that there is a need in Turkey to
transform the strong state tradition into an effective, accountable and post-
developmental state that governs societal affairs in a democratic and caring
way, and second, that without focusing on the production side of the econ-
omy and recognizing its culturally based institutional structure that con-
tains in it different identity claims and citizenship rights, it is not possible
to create a democratic and economically advanced Turkey.

On 3 November 2002, the national election took place in Turkey, and
all the political parties representing the old, statist, clientalist, corruption-
producing and crisis-ridden Turkey have been penalized very strongly by
the Turkish electorate. The Justice and Development Party (the AKP) has won the election and constituted a single-party majority rule. The extent to which the AKP can achieve what it has promised, that is, to work hard to create a democratic, pluralist, economically and politically well-governed, prosperous, just and strong Turkey ready to become a full member of the EU, remains to be seen. So far, in its governing the AKP appears to have chosen change over status quo, effective governing over populism, and democratization over nationalism and isolations. This choice constitutes a crucial step for the transformation of Turkey into a powerful, democratic and respectful actor of world politics. One should not forget, however, that the possibility of creating a democratic and powerful Turkey lies in the understanding of the changing nature of the political economy of Turkish modernity. Herein lies the contribution of the present paper.

NOTES

1 The historical reference of this paper is decided to include the period beginning from 1980 and the 1990s for two reasons: (i) this period is important in economic terms as Turkey’s neo-liberal experiment started in 1980 with the adaptation of structural and stabilization programs under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank. Although its success can be questioned, Turkish economy began to be integrated into the global market from 1980 onwards. The period 1980–1989 can be called the early phase of liberalization efforts in Turkish economy. But the critical point in terms of Turkey’s complete encounter with the process of financial globalization came with the decision to establish full capital account liberalization in August 1989. From 1989 onwards, Turkish financial markets are open to financial globalization completely. The period between 1989–current can be called the later phase; (ii) this period is important in political and cultural terms as the 1980s constitute the years in which the Turkish modernization project of the 1923 began to be challenged by the identity claims of the Islamists and Kurds and the idea of national developmentalism was thought to come to an end.

2 In our research, we have done an extensive investigation of TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and SIADs by conducting in-depth interviews with the leaders of these organizations and the content analysis of their publications, reports and public speeches, collecting data from the related literature on these organizations. Whereas TÜSİAD and TÜSİAD members are mainly located in Istanbul, the organizational scope of MÜSİAD and SIADs extends towards Anatolia. For this reason, our in-depth interviews for MÜSİAD and SIADs involved trips to Anatolian cities where there is a strong tie between the development of export-oriented economy and the political, economic and cultural activities of these organizations.

3 This point has also been made by Kramer in his recent book Kramer (2000).

4 We prefer using the term ‘alternative modernities’ to those of ‘non-Western modernity’ Göle (1998) and ‘multiple modernities’ Eisenstadt (2000), even though all these terms are constructed to suggest that there are different passages to and different developments of modernity in our globalizing world. Within the limited scope of this paper, we are not concerned about the particular differences between these concepts. For a useful discussion of these concepts and their differences see Ong (1999, especially Ch. 1).
5 For an important source, see Berger (1997).
6 The term 'Islamic capital' is also used interchangeably as the 'green capital' or the 'Anatolian capital'.
7 See also A. Buğra (1999).
8 See note 2.
9 That is why these cities are sometimes characterized, in analogy with the South Asian-model of economic development, as 'Anatolian Tigers'. Understanding the process in which this model has been put into practice in these cities gives us crucial insights, which could explicate and delineate the varying impacts of cultural globalization in Turkey.
10 On 29 May 2002, TÜSİAD gave a full-page advertisement to newspapers about the emergency of EU membership and warned the politicians not to lose time on the road to become a member of the EU and to carry out the necessary reforms required to be accepted as a member by the EU. This advertisement was taken seriously as TÜSİAD was said to topple the Ecevit government in 1979 by the full-page advertisements it gave to newspapers. The title of the advertisement dated 29 May was 'what kind of future is waiting for Turkey?'. TÜSİAD claimed that Turkey is at a historical turning point in the sense that if Turkey can not get a date from EU for discussions about her membership until the end of 2002, she will remain behind the other countries and be left alone in the globalization process. The advertisement ends with the following words: 'The EU membership constitutes the guarantee for Turkish youth's future. For this reason, all political parties and our parliament should cooperate to take the necessary steps on the way to the EU' (The dailies Milliyet, Hürriyet, Sabah, 29 May 2002). It is debatable to what extent TÜSİAD's advertisement is influential but on 3 August 2002, Turkish Parliament has taken a critical step towards starting accession negotiations with the EU by passing new reform law. The package comprises fourteen items, including controversial 'abolishment of capital punishment', 'removal of any legal provisions forbidding the use of mother tongues other than Turkish in TV/radio broadcasting and education', and 'ensuring cultural diversity and guaranteeing cultural rights for all citizens'.
11 An interview with Faruk Eczacıbaşi, 18 April 2000, İstanbul.
12 In this regard, TÜSİAD's two consecutive reports 'Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey' (1997; 2001–2) are important attempts of the Association where TÜSİAD has pointed to the deficiencies in Turkish democracy to be improved.
13 This point is also emphasized by Cem Boyner, one of the ex-presidents of TÜSİAD, that they describe TÜSİAD as a pressure group whose members are consisted of courageous people who can sacrifice their own interests for Turkey's big interests. He stated that some time TÜSİAD went ahead the public in posing suggestions to improve Turkey's economy and politics in the sense that some of the reports of the Association like 'Democracy Reports' were not approved by some segments of the society; but TÜSİAD is a pressure group that dares to take risks (Özkan and Tosun, 2000: 38). In his farewell speech, Kayhan, the ex-president of the organization, stated that TÜSİAD is an institution that produces ideas and spreads them. Kayhan emphasized that rather than giving reactions to the events, they put forward the businessmen's ideas. At the end, like Boyner, he argued that TÜSİAD was not an interest group, but it was a pressure group (The daily Sabah, 13 January 1999). Here, the difference between pressure group and interest group should be stated though mostly, these two terms are used interchangeably. The term 'interest group' is used
for a particular type of pressure group—one which defends and promotes the self-interests of a section of society whereas the term ‘pressure group’ is used for a group that exists to further the interests of others or the public interest as defined by the group (Baggott, 1995: 9, 14).

These features of the Association can be extracted from the following words of the president Ali Bayramoğlu: ‘Solidarity and helping each other constitute the main principles of MÜSİAD ... When a member gets into trouble, other members will help him as soon as possible and give him their hands to return his former power and prosperity’ (The daily Gözlem, 5 October 1992). The first and the former president Erol Yarar emphasized the primacy of community over individual by arguing that MÜSİAD is not consisted of businessmen who give priority to their self-interests. They spend their earnings on the behalf of community’s interest (The daily Milliyet, 17 August 1993; The journal Aydınlik, 21 November 1993).

In his writing where he defines the attitudes and behaviors of a Muslim man in economic life, Zaim criticizes both capitalism and socialism for their materialist world-view. In these systems, the type of man they are in mind is ‘Homo Economicus’. He stated that in Islamic economy, the suggested type of man is ‘Homo Islamicus’ who is free in economic life after equipped with Islamic principles and orders of the God (Zaim, 1995: 101–2). ‘Homo Economicus’ is criticized by also Balci who argued that economic man’s life is limited by his individual and worldly life (Balci, 1995: 113) (in Koyuncu, 2002: 367–8).

‘Aside from anti-individualism (family duty and community obligation), the other chief characteristics attributed to “Asian values” are economic, social and political discipline as well as an organic notion of state and society’ (Thompson, 2000: 651).

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